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Abstract
Highly indebted developing economies commonly also hold large external reserves.
This behavior seems puzzling given that governments borrow with an interest rate
penalty to compensate lenders for default risk. Reducing debt to the same extent as
reserves would reduce interest payments, however reserves also have insurance benefits
during default crises. Moreover reserves can also be used to improve lenders recovery
rates upon default, thus decreasing the interest rate penalty in non-defaulting times.
A standard model of sovereign default risk, augmented with distortionary tax policies
and debt restructuring, can quantitatively replicate the observed data patterns on debt
and reserves holdings.
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1 Introduction
International reserves are important policy tools in developing economies. A clear pattern
from the data shows that many countries decide to hold large positions of international
reserves while, at the same time, maintain high levels of external debts. This observation has
intrigued economists that raised questions about the optimal management of international
reserves. Holding reserves while keeping positive debt levels entails a cost when borrowing
interest rates are larger than the interest rate earned on the foreign assets. For instance,
by the end of 2005, governments of emerging economies held on average more that 15% of
GDP in foreign reserves, while external debts were on excess of 33% of GDP. This behavior,
not exclusive to a few Asian countries, seems to be more general and includes also Latin
American countries (figure 1). Departing from this observation, Rodrik (2006) estimated
that these countries incur annually in an average GDP loss of 1% for maintaining a choice
of high debt and reserves. Others have however argued that this cost is outweighed by the
benefit that reserves provide as an insurance instrument against the occurrence of financial
crisis (Feldstein, 1999). This paper deals with the question of why developing economies
hold simultaneously large amounts of debt and reserves, and what kind of financial crisis are
more prone to induce such choice.
Figure 1: International reserves and external debt accumulation for Latin American countries
in 2005 (source: World Development Indicators)
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To analyze the above question, this paper adds four new features to the sovereign default
model of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). First, reserves accumulation is explicitly modeled by
allowing the sovereign government to choose a portfolio of external debt and international
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reserves. Second, the government is assumed to raise revenue using distortionary taxation.
Third, the model includes a sudden stop shock, defined as a complete impediment to borrow.
That is, if the economy is hit by a sudden stop shock, the sovereign cannot borrow in the
current period and has to repay its debt or default. This feature of the model intends to
reinforce the role of financial crisis at generating positive demand of reserves for precaution-
ary motives. Fourth, a renegotiation stage is assumed to occur after a sovereign defaults.
By allowing for endogenous renegotiation between lenders and the government, the model
adequately accounts for realistic debt reductions observed in the data. Additionally, if inter-
national reserves affect the sovereign value of regaining access to international markets, then
different levels of reserves will imply different recovery rates for the lenders, thus providing
another channel influencing demand for international reserves.
The model economy works as follows. A government from a small open economy chooses
distortionary taxes, international reserves and external debt in order to finance public expen-
diture and maximize households welfare. Households supply labor to firms that produce final
consumption goods subjected to productivity shocks. However, wages earned by households
are taxed by the government. Due to limited commitment in international credit markets,
lenders cannot oblige governments to repay and therefore supply credit with an interest
rate spread that reflect the risk of default. If the government decides to default, domestic
productivity suffers a loss and access to credit markets is temporarily barred until debt is re-
structured. Additionally, if the economy is hit by a sudden stop shock, international lenders
loose faith in the government credit for exogenous reasons. If that happens, the government
has two options: either adjust consumption by repaying all outstanding debt, or default and
bear the associated losses.
Given a positive probability of default, the interest rate spread for debt will be positive.
Therefore, an impatient government, desiring to shift consumption from the future to the
present by taking debt, will face a large cost of carrying positive amounts of risk free interest
paying reserves. Reducing simultaneously debt and reserves increases current consumption
as the interest rate on reserves is lower than the interest rate on debt and the level of net debt
doesn’t change. Given this cost, it seems unreasonable for a government to hold any debt at
all if reserves have no other purpose. However, a choice of no reserves makes the economy
more exposed to sudden stops. If the economy is hit by a sudden stop, the government is
forced to adjust consumption either by repaying debt or defaulting. In this case, reserves can
be used to repay debt, helping the government to prevent a sharp adjustment in consumption
and even a default event. The larger the costs associated with the impact of a financial crisis,
the more the insurance provided by reserves1. On one hand, pro-cyclical taxation, especially
1Recent empirical evidence finds that international reserves reduce the likelihood that a country is hit
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recurrent in developing economies (Gavin and Perotti, 1997; Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh,
2005), aggravates such costs as higher taxes distorts output further more. On the other
hand, if a government defaults, then current reserves are used during debt restructuring
negotiations, thus affecting the recovery rate that lenders face. With reserves providing a
limited benefit to the government would it be permanently in autarky, recovery rates will be
positively related with the level of reserves. This mechanism provides an additional channel
over which a positive level of reserves provides benefits to impatient governments: lenders
will transmit an expected higher recovery rate to lower interest rate spreads. To summarize,
reserves provide two main benefits to the government: an insurance benefit arising from a
precautionary motif and a decrease in interest rate from the renegotiation channel.
Using the model outlined above, this paper goal is to explain non-trivial levels of reserve
and debt to output ratios while verifying other features from the data at the business cycle
frequency. The focus on a short-term analysis is related with the fact that international
reserves seem to be actively managed by governments during crisis periods. Broner, Didier,
Erce, and Schmukler (2011) documents dynamics related to debt and reserve accumulation
around times of financial crisis in emerging market economies, namely, that gross capital
inflows and outflows are correlated and both collapse around crisis. Additionally, this paper
also documents a positive association of international reservers and recovery rates using a
dataset compiled by Benjamin and Wright (2009) on default episodes and debt restructuring.
These two empirical regularities are analyzed by computing a numerical solution for the
model outlined above. The resulting simulations are then used to generate moments that are
compared against Mexican data. The reasons for the choice of this country as a benchmark
to evaluate the model relate to the fact that: Mexico is representative of emerging market
economies in the sense that its debt and reserves dynamics resemble figure 1; and this
economy experienced several financial crisis in the last 30 years.
Link with the literature
This paper is related with the literature of sovereign default of small open economies,
where the classical work is Eaton and Gersovitz (1981). In that paper, the authors present
a small open economy dynamic model with non-contingent debt and lack of full commit-
ment that generates equilibrium default. Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) show the quantita-
tive relevance of that model in replicating key business cycle statistics for emerging market
economies, in particular, pro-cyclical dynamics of net capital inflows. In a related paper,
Arellano (2008) uses a non-linear output loss in the event of a default (increasing in the
negatively by global adverse effects, for example, Frankel and Saravelos (2012) or Bussière, Cheng, Chinn,
and Lisack (2014).
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endowment realization) to generate similar results but with a higher default rate that is in
fact closer to what is seen in the dade. Using a model similar to Eaton and Gersovitz, Alfaro
and Kanczuk (2009) study directly reserve and debt accumulation by small open economies,
concluding that reserves play no role as insurance instruments. Two main reasons explain
why they find such result. First, a proportional output loss is assumed as the penalty faced
by economies that default. As a result, a substantially low discount factor has to be used in
order to generate realistic debt to GDP holdings. With such a lower discount factor, savings
becomes almost prohibited in the model. Second, the only risk faced by borrowers in their
model is endowment fluctuations. In that case, reserves provide a bad hedge against that
risk: market exclusion becomes more bearable when the government holds reserves, thus
increasing the spread charged by lenders.
Alternatively, the model presented in this paper uses an output loss similar to Arellano
(2008), and adds a sudden stop shock2. Ranciere and Jeanne (2006) provides an early model
where reserves play a direct role in providing insurance against sudden stops when the coun-
try has positive debt holdings. In that paper, a sudden stop is modeled as a persistent event
that, on top of the exclusion from markets, entails a output losses on its own. More recently,
Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez (2012) use the same idea to generate positive demand for
reserves in a model of the Eaton and Gersovitz type with long-term debt. Contrary to those
papers, the sudden stop shock version used in this paper does not impact the country in
any other way, but in a temporary lack of credit access, similarly to the sudden stop shock
proposed in Roch and Uhlig, 2012. Additionally, this paper includes endogenous renegoti-
ation and distortionary taxation to the model. Yue (2010) studies the interaction between
sovereign default and ex post debt renegotiation, concluding that recovery rates are decreas-
ing the the level of debt. Detragiache (1996) and Aizenman and Marion (2004), using simple
two-period models, have argued that costly taxation might play an important role in gen-
erating demand for reserves when the country faces default risk. Under such circumstances
governments would want to prevent not just the direct effect of an output loss generated by
a default event, but also the costs of raising revenues when taxation is particularly costly.
More recently, Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) underline that distortionary taxation
becomes especially relevant in an environment of limited risk sharing due to the presence
of default. In their model, tax rates increase when output is low, consistent with evidence
that developing economies tend to maintain pro-cyclical fiscal policies (Gavin and Perotti,
1997; Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh, 2005; Vegh and Vuletin, 2012; Bauducco and Caprioli,
2014).
This paper contributes to the literature by providing a framework for studying the dynam-
2A term first used in Calvo (1998).
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ics of reserves, debt, and sovereign spreads. Moreover, the results points to the importance
of distortionary taxation and debt restructuring for a realistic quantification of the demand
for reserves. To my best knowledge, this paper is the first that can deliver realistic results
regarding debt and reserves using a model with one-period debt.
Main Results
As a preview of the results presented in later sections, the model used in this paper
is quantitatively able to replicate some data moments of the business cycle statistics, such
as large debt holdings, default rates, negative co-movement of trade balance and output,
and positive correlation between gross capital outflows and inflows. Additionally, strong
reserve accumulation is also generated in the simulations. This result contrasts the findings
from Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009). The reason why this emerges as a result is related with
the fact that, under the proposed model, losses of default are painful enough to generate a
large insurance role for reserves. Of key importance to this result is the extension of the
baseline model to include debt restructuring and costly fiscal collection. Quantitative results
from computing and calibrating the model indicate that the baseline model can generate
10% international reserves to GDP as seen in the data for Mexico. If fiscal distortions are
shutdown from the model, then only 5% reserves to GDP are sustained in equilibrium, and,
if renegotiation is not allowed, only 0.4% reserves to GDP are generated.
The remaining paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 identifies the main trends in the data
and shows empirical relationships between reserves and relevant variables. Section 3 presents
the model and defines the equilibrium. Section 4 justifies the functional forms, calibration
and analyzes the simulation results. Section 5 concludes the paper. The numerical procedure
and alternative model specifications are relegated into appendices in A.
2 Empirical Evidence
This paper is mostly concerned with the accumulation of international reserves and ex-
ternal debts.
For that purpose, international reserves are defined as external assets held by a country’s
government or central bank. According to the guidelines of the International Financial
Statistics (IFS), compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), these assets “comprise
holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members held by the
IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange”, in which should be included, “foreign banknotes,
bank deposits, treasury bills, short- and long-term government securities”. As such, most
assets considered as reserves are highly liquid and yielding interest close to the risk free
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rate. It should be noted however that assets managed by sovereign wealth funds, typically
yielding higher returns, are not considered international reserves. Different management
principles dictate the dynamics of such funds, often characterized by the seek of higher
yields or strategic value, and, for that reason, fall outside the scope of this study.
In its turn, external debts are defined by the IFS as “external obligations of public debtors,
including the national government, political subdivisions (or an agency of either), and au-
tonomous public bodies, and external obligations of private debtors that are guaranteed for
repayment by a public entity”3. Because this paper focus on the implications of debt default
on risk sharing, the debt considered is that owned directly or indirectly by a government,
that is by an agent with the option to repudiate it.
Additional details, definitions and sources for all variables used in this paper can be found
in appendix A.1.
What are the costs of holding international reserves?
Part of the reason why a choice of large debt and reserves is intriguing relates with the
cost of maintaining such portfolio. As an example, consider a situation where the borrowing
interest rate equals i and the savings i∗. In this case, i · ND is the cost of holding ND
of debt without any reserves. An equal net debt holding can be achieved by borrowing
D = ND + R and, at the same time, saving R. The total interest cost of this choice would
be i · (ND + R) and i∗ · R would be the revenues. Thus, the cost difference between these
two financing options amounts to (i− i∗) ·R, that is, if the borrowing interest rate is higher
than the saving interest rate, holding debt and reserves carries a cost equal to the interest
rate difference - or spread - times the level of reserves.
This example is closely related with the trends observed in emerging market economies.
Figure 2 illustrates this fact by showing both levels of external debt and international reserves
for a group of selected countries. External debt varies between 15 and 60% of GDP, while
international reserves between 5 and 20%. With a positive spread between the interest rate
on debt relative to reserves, such gap becomes costly. In fact, due to prevalent sovereign debt
crisis in emerging market countries, spreads have been large as international investors take
into account the risk of default when they lend to such countries (see figure 3). Spreads4 are
generally quite volatile and high, reaching magnitudes of 20% and larger, even in non-default
3Due to data limitations from the World Development Indicators, public and privately owned external
short-term debt are indistinguishable and will be included in the measures of debt used in this paper without
distinction.
4Spreads are given by the secondary market rate, provided by JPMorgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index
(EMBI). These spreads are measured by an index that includes sovereign and quasi-sovereign (guaranteed by
the sovereign) instruments that satisfy certain liquidity criteria in their trading. All spreads are calculated as
the premium paid by an emerging market economy over a U.S. government bond with comparable maturity.
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Figure 2: Debt in selected emerging market economies in 2000
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Figure 3: Spreads in selected emerging market economies
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episode periods5. With these facts, a crude estimate on the annual cost of holding reserves
can be built as being the simple product of the spreads and international reserves. Table
1 shows the calculations: costs can be substantial, oscillating on average between a range
of 0.31 to 1.54% annual GDP6. Rodrik (2006), using different assumptions, also estimates
substantial costs that can be larger than 1% of GDP.
5The extreme interest rate spread spikes observed in Argentina and Ecuador coincide with default
episodes.
6The range changes to 0.28-0.9% annual GDP if Argentina is excluded.
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Table 1: Crude estimates of costs of holding reserves for selected countries (in % of annual
GDP)
year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Argentine 0.59 0.84 5.90 6.08 6.70 4.11 0.51 0.57 1.20 1.87 0.98
Brazil 0.37 0.58 1.03 0.75 0.43 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.35 0.45 0.27
Ecuador 1.85 0.61 0.51 0.43 0.31 0.37 0.24 0.47 0.91 1.34 0.36
Mexico 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.20 0.34 0.21
Peru 0.92 1.09 1.05 0.72 0.64 0.35 0.30 0.36 0.66 0.74 0.48
Philippines 0.96 1.21 0.91 0.93 0.81 0.72 0.44 0.40 0.69 0.89 0.64
Turkey 0.43 0.90 0.93 0.74 0.34 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.38 0.45 0.26
Venezuela 1.18 0.91 1.36 2.50 1.21 0.85 0.44 0.48 1.13 1.32 0.81
mean 0.81 0.79 1.49 1.54 1.32 0.88 0.31 0.36 0.69 0.93 0.50
International reserves impact on interest rate spreads
Given non-negligible costs of holding reserves, one could argue that there must be counter-
weight benefits to rationalize the observed levels of reserves. This section explores potential
benefits of holding international reserves through their influence on interest rate spreads. To
evaluate empirically the relationship between spreads and international reserves, this study
follows a long literature of regressing spreads on covariates7. All variables and sources are
described in appendix A.1. Our evidence is based on large panel regressions controlling for
country and time effects using annual data. Periods of default and market exclusion are
not considered for the analysis. Table 2 reports the results from 3 different commonly used
econometric specifications.
All three specifications are consistent at showing that reserves to GDP are negatively
associated with spreads while controlling for other variables8. As for external debt to GDP,
the coefficients across regressions have the opposite sign. These results maintain statistical
significance even after controlling for country and time effects. The fixed effects column in
table 2 shows that an increase of 10pp of reserves to GDP is associated with an average fall
of spreads in the order of 36 basis points or 0.36%. At the same time a 10pp increase of
debt to GDP or fall in real GDP of 10% is associated with an increase of spreads of 29 and
60 basis points respectively. The regression coefficients for the remaining controls have the
expected signs, for example, countries under worse budget condition have larger spreads, or
7For example Edwards (1984), Akitoby and Stratmann (2008) or Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer
(2009).
8To deal with potential sources of contemporaneous endogeneity with spreads, lagged variables were used
for: reserves/GDP, debt/GDP, real GDP growth rate, revenues/GDP, expenditures/GDP, inflation and
current account to GDP.
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economies with better institutions, measured from a rule of law index, tend to be associated
with lower spreads. These results update and are consistent with previous empirical studies.
For the purpose of this paper, the main message is that international reserves seem to be
negatively related with interest rates charged to countries that seek external financing. Such
effect can be seen as a benefit to hold international reserves.
Table 2: Effects of international reserves on spreads (dependent variable: annual mean spread
in basis points)
Pooled OLS Random Effects Fixed effects
L.reserves to gdp (%) -2.52∗∗ -3.78∗∗ -3.56∗
(0.67) (1.38) (1.85)
L.debt to gdp (%) 2.12∗∗ 2.49∗∗ 2.86∗∗
(0.44) (0.68) (0.8)
L.rgdp growth rate (%) -1.71 -5.39∗ -6.04∗∗
(3.48) (2.75) (2.8)
L.revenues to gdp (%) -10.78∗∗ -11.37 -9.69
(3.61) (7.43) (9.89)
L.expenditures to gdp (%) 11.56∗∗ 12.16∗∗ 13.22∗∗
(3.86) (5.43) (5.87)
L.inflation (%) 9.17∗∗ 6.75∗∗ 6.69∗∗
(2.91) (1.41) (1.49)
L.current account to gdp (%) 1.50 -3.29 -5.84∗
(1.89) (2.85) (3.16)
Openness -0.15 0.04 0.08
(0.3) (0.66) (1.03)
Contagion 0.12 0.17∗∗ 0.20∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Rule of law -298.53∗∗ -322.16∗∗ -351.26∗∗
(43.71) (64.44) (78.19)
Urban population -0.56 -0.21 9.84
(0.83) (1.71) (9.17)
constant 454.16∗∗ 65.49 -539.27
(107.82) (145.51) (610.42)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 304 304 304
R2 0.59 0.56 0.36
International reserves and haircuts
Rational investors lending to a country should price the interest rate taking into account
the probability of repayment and, in case of a default, the expected recovery rate of the
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overdue debt. Previous empirical studies on the determinants of interest rate spreads, for
example Edwards (1984) or Akitoby and Stratmann (2008), assume that such expected
recovery rate is zero, implying that regression coefficients similar to the ones presented in
table 2 could be directly mapped into default probabilities. However, with non-zero expected
recovery rates, these coefficients may confound two different effects of the related variable:
the probability of default and the expected recovery rate. This implies that a more complete
analysis of the relationship of reserves on spreads should also take into account how recovery
rates relate with reserves.
Figure 4: Haircuts on default episodes for middle income countries
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To better study how recovery rates or, using a different term, haircuts (defined as the
complement of the recovery rate), I use a dataset on historical haircuts associated to sovereign
default episodes compiled by Benjamin and Wright (2009). These estimates have become
commonly used in the literature studying restructuring of sovereign defaulted debt9. Figure
4 shows how haircuts relate with lagged reserves, debt and GDP growth rate. The picture
suggests a negative relationship between haircuts and reserves, that is, the higher the level
the reserves, the larger is the recovery rate on the defaulted debt. At the same time, countries
with larger debt to GDP tend to have large haircuts and GDP growth rate doesn’t seem to
matter much for haircuts. Simple multivariate regression techniques10 presented in table 3
confirm that observation, showing a negative a statistically significant coefficient for lagged
reserves even after controlling for lagged debt or output growth: a 10pp increase in lagged
reserves to GDP is associated with 16pp fall in debt haircuts.
9Examples include Yue (2010) and Erasmo (2008), where the first studies how haircuts change with the
level of debt, and the second studies how haircuts are related with delays in restructuring.
10More elaborate regression techniques, exploring the panel structure of the data, were not used due to
small number of default observations per country.
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Table 3: Effects of international reserves on haircuts (dependent variable: haircut in % of
overdue debt)
Haircut OLS I OLS II OLS III
L.reserves to gdp (%) -1.17∗∗ -1.6∗∗ -1.6∗∗
L.debt to gdp (%) 0.30∗∗ 0.31∗∗
L.rgdp growth rate (%) 0.46
Constant 44.76 34.68 32.84
Observations 58 51 51
R2 0.06 0.23 0.23
3 Model
In light of the evidence presented in the previous sections, a model economy is introduced
in this section where the optimal choice of reserves depends on the tradeoff between the cost of
holding reserves, closely related with interest rate spread, and the benefits of holding reserves,
linked to 3 different factors: smoothing the impact of a crisis on consumption, minimizing
fiscal distortions on production, and change the negotiation position in default episodes.
These last 2 benefits represent the main innovation that is introduced here relatively to
previous models from the literature. In proceeding this way, the model allows for a better
accounting of the observed dynamics regarding debt and reserves.
The model economy11 builds up from the classical work of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981),
with recent applications in, among others, Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and Arellano (2008).
A small open economy is populated with a representative household, a firm and a government.
The household is ’hand-to-mouth’, simply consuming any income net of taxes earned in each
period - they never own any asset whatsoever. This assumption mutes domestic credit
markets to highlight the role of external debt and international reserves markets. The firm
buys labor to produce final goods with a production function that is subjected to diminishing
returns and to a multiplicative technology shock. The government acts on behalf of the
household by making decisions about the amount of debt and reserves to hold - available in
international markets. It also taxes consumers in order to finance public expenditures which,
for the sake of simplicity, are exogenous. Due to limited commitment in the enforcement of
debt contracts, the government can default on its own debt. Under such scenario, access to
international markets is temporarily shut down and a renegotiation process follows. While
excluded, firms suffer a loss in productivity and lenders recover part of the repudiated debt
11A simple version of this model with some implications is introduced in the appendix A.2.
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by allowing the government to regain access to the market. Additionally, in any time period,
lenders can loose confidence in debtors for exogenous reasons. A sudden stop then echoes as
an impediment to the renewal of the government’s loans.
3.1 Household
An infinite lived representative household values lifetime consumption and labor accord-
ingly to:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht) (1)
where E is the expectation operator, β denotes the discount factor, and the period utility
u : R+ × [0, 1]→ R is: continuous, differentiable and concave in both arguments; increasing
in c and decreasing in h.
The household supplies labor to the firm at a wage rate wt, taxed at a rate τt. No savings
are allowed and profits pit are transferred as lump sum. Income thus earned is used for
consumption, yielding the following time t budget constrain:
ct = (1− τt)wtht + pit (2)
Optimal household behavior regarding consumption and hours supply can therefore be
characterized by equation (2) and the following first order condition:
− uh(ct, ht)
uc(ct, ht)
= (1− τt)wt (3)
3.2 Firm
The firm in the economy maximizes profits by using labor ht in a production technology
subjected to diminishing returns f(ht) and random productivity shocks zt. The function
f : [0, 1] → R is continuous, differentiable, concave and satisfies the Inada conditions. The
productivity shock zt evolves accordingly to a Markov process. Profits in time t are given by
pit = ztf(ht)− wtht (4)
Which imply the following labor demand condition:
wt = ztfh(ht) (5)
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3.3 Government
Acting on the household’s behalf, the government with a good credit history has the abil-
ity to borrow or save in international markets. Due to incompleteness of financial markets,
the government can only borrow by selling non-contingent one period bonds Dt. At the
same time, it can also choose to save by buying international reserves Rt. To finance public
expenditures gt, it can also tax wages. If the government decides to repudiate its own debt,
credit history becomes bad with further exclusion from international credit markets. In this
situation, firms productivity becomes z˜t = zt− l(zt), where l(zt) is a continuous loss function
such that 0 ≤ l(zt) ≤ zt. Putting all elements together, the government budget constraint
in period t is given by:
τtwtht = gt +Dt − qtDt+1 −Rt + q¯Rt+1 if good credit history (6)
τtwtht = gt −Rt + q¯Rt+1 otherwise (7)
where qt is the price of new debt and q¯ the risk-free price of new international reserves.
3.4 International investors
International investors provide debt and reserve assets to the government. However, the
economy can suffer a random sudden stop shock denoted by s. Similarly to Roch and Uhlig
(2012), s is interpreted as a “crisis” sunspot where, for extraneous reasons, the government
looses access to international markets12. In this model the sudden shock realization is in-
dependent from all other variables, taking the value s = 1 if the economy is hit or s = 0 if
it’s not. If the economy is in a sudden stop, no international investor provides credit to the
economy. This is equivalent as stating that the price of new debt equals zero. If instead the
economy is not in a sudden stop, international investors price debt so that, in expectation,
their profits are zero. In the event of a default, it is assumed that they recover an amount
ϕ˜(D,R, z) ∈ [0, D] of the arrears debt in the period following renegotiation. Note that un-
der this case, the recovery rate schedule is given by ϕ˜(D,R, z)/D. Letting Z˜(D,R, z) be an
indicator function taking 1 if the government defaults and 0 otherwise, new debt becomes
priced as:
12For a model where sunspots can generate large shifts in the borrowing conditions see Cole and Kehoe
(2000).
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q(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt, st) =
0 if st = 1q(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt) otherwise (8)
where
q(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt) =q¯ ·
{∫ [
1− Z˜(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt+1)
]
dF (zt+1, st+1|zt, st)
+
∫
Z˜(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt+1) · q¯ ϕ˜(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt+1)
Dt+1
dF (zt+1, st+1|zt, st)
}
(9)
and it is assumed that (zt, st) evolve according to the transition probability given by F (zt+1, st+1|zt, st).
From the definition of (8), the price schedule is bounded by qt ∈ [0, q¯], in other words, interest
rate on borrowing is always equal or larger than the risk free rate.
3.5 Timing
The events characterizing this model can be structured with the following order. At the
beginning of period t, a government with good credit history:
1. Starts period t with debt and reserves levels of Dt and Rt respectively.
2. Sudden stop and productivity shocks are realized: st and zt.
3. The government decides whether or not to default.
(a) If the government decides not to default:
i. Choses Dt+1, and Rt+1 at prices q(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt, st). The remaining variables
(ct, ht, τt, wt, pit) are determined by the model’s agents13.
ii. Advances to period t + 1 with a good credit history and debt and reserves
levels of Dt+1 and Rt+1.
(b) If the government decides do default:
i. The country enters in financial autarky. The government still chooses Rt+1
and the remaining variables (ct, ht, τt, wt, pit) are determined by the model’s
agents. At the same time, the government negotiates how to restructure its
debts with lenders, agreeing to pay ϕ˜(Dt, Rt, zt) next period.
13Note that when Dt+1 and Rt+1 are chosen, τt is uniquely determined from equations (3), (5), (6) and
(7).
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ii. Advances to period t + 1 still with bad credit history. The government pays
ϕ(Dt, Rt, zt) and decides on Rt+2. The remaining variables are determined
(ct, ht, τt, wt, pit) by the model agents.
iii. Advances to period t+2 with a good credit history, no debt and reserves level
of Rt+2.
Given that the focus of this paper is not in the study of delays in debt restructuring, it is
assumed in the model that restructuring is exogenously resolved in the period that follows
a default. Given this framework, the government must negotiate a debt restructuring with
lenders when it defaults and, in the next period, transfer the agreed amount. Despite being
restrictive, this environment generates results that are similar to the ones obtained in models
of renegotiation such as Yue (2010) or Erasmo (2008) where agents choose to renegotiate
very quickly, even though they are specifically allowed to delay repayments or renegotiations.
For convenience, the timing of the model is also schematized in figure 5.
Figure 5: Sequence of events of the model
(Dt, Rt, zt, st)
good credit history
DEFAULT
choose Rt+1
restructure ϕ(Dt, Rt, zt)
market exclusion
(Rt+1, zt+1)
repay and choose Rt+2
market exclusion
(Dt+2 = 0, Rt+2, zt+2, st+2)
good credit history
REPAY choose {Dt+1, Rt+1}
(Dt+1, Rt+1, zt+1, st+1)
good credit history
3.6 Recursive formulation of the problem
The government problem consists in maximizing consumers utility given by (1) subject to
all the constraints summarized in equations (2) to (8). Let vrep be the value for a government
who repays its debt, vdef the value of a government who defaults and (D,R, z, s) state
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variables. Then the previous problem can be represented recursively as:
vrep(D,R, z, s) = max
D′,R′
{
u(c, h) + βEz,s
[
max
{
vrep(D′, R′, z′, s′), vdef (D′, R′, z′)
}]}
(10)
st
c = zf(h)− g −D + qD′ +R− q¯R′ (11)
− uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= zfh(h)− g +D − qD
′ −R + q¯R′
h
(12)
The first constraint (11), resulting from combining equations (2), and (4)-(6), is a resources
constraint: private and public consumption equate to the sum of domestic production plus
net external inflows, whether positives or negatives. The second constraint (12), which
combines (2)-(6), is a labor market equilibrium condition. That is, it represents the set of
competitive allocations (c, h) such that both consumers and firms are optimizing given prices
and taxes. Note also that, under this representation, tax rate is no longer explicitly present
in the equations. This is because they are determined by the next period choice of debt and
reserves. As such, the government’s problem collapses into choosing the level of reserves and
debt for next period subject to both resources and labor market constraints. Note however
that given an allocation (c∗, h∗, D′∗, R′∗) that is a solution for (10), tax rates can be recovered
from equations (3) and (5):
(1− τ) = −uh(c
∗, h∗)
uc(c∗, h∗)
· 1
zfh(h∗)
If, instead, the government decides not to repay, it spends one additional period in
financial autarky that will be used to reach an agreement with its creditors. Given these
elements, the government’s value of default can be defined as:
vdef (D,R, z) = max
R′
{
u(c, h) + Ez
[
max
R′′
{βu(c′) + βEz′vrep(0, R′′, z′′, 0)}
]}
(13)
st
c = z˜(z)f(h)− g +R− q¯R′
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= z˜(z)fh(h)− g −R + q¯R
′
h
c′ = z˜(z′)f(h′)− g +R′ − q¯R′′ − ϕ˜(D,R, z)
uh(c
′, h′)
uc(c′, h′)
= z˜(z′)f ′h(c
′, h′)− g −R
′ + q¯R′′
h′
R
′ ≤ R
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The first and second pair of equations represent the resources constraints in the first and
second period, before the government is readmitted in international credit markets. In the
first period of default, the government suffers a productivity loss z˜(z) and agrees to repay
ϕ˜(D,R, z) to his creditors in the next period. Here, I assume that in order to regain access
to international markets, the government has first to repay his agreed debt. Note that the
last constrain imposes that the government cannot increase reserves while in autarky. This
assumption prevents the government from accumulating too much reserves in the period
preceding restructuring. A more complete model with a longer and uncertain period of
market exclusion would not require to have such constraint.
3.7 Renegotiation
As in Yue (2010), if the government defaults and becomes excluded of international
markets, then renegotiation follows immediately where borrowers and lenders bargain over a
recovery amount in exchange for access to international credit markets. If negotiations fail,
the government becomes forever excluded of international credit markets. Let vaut(R, z) be
the value of permanent autarky and vrep(0, R, z, s) the value of being in the market with zero
debt. For a government owing D, holding R and with productivity z, reaching an agreement
for a recovery amount ϕ has a value given by:
ΛG(ϕ;D,R, z) = max
R′<R
{
u(c, h) + Ez,s
[
max
R′′<R′
{u(c′, h′) + βEz′,s′ [vrep(0, R′′, z′′, s′′)]}
]}
−vaut(R, z)
st
c = z˜(z)f(h)− g +R− q¯R′
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= z˜(z)fh(h)− g −R + q¯R
′
h
c′ = z˜(z′)f(h′)− g +R′ − q¯R′′ − ϕ
uh(c
′, h′)
uc(c′, h′)
= z˜(z′)f ′h(h
′)− g −R
′ + q¯R′′
h′
R
′ ≤ R
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where z− z˜ = l(z) ≥ 0 represents the output loss of exclusion and the outside option for the
government - permanent autarky - has a value of:
vaut(R, z) = max
R′
{
u(c, h) + βEz
[
vaut(R′, z′)
]}
(14)
st
c = z˜(z)f(h)− g +R− q¯R′ (15)
uh(c, h)
uc(c, h)
= z˜(z)fh(h)− g −R + q¯R
′
h
(16)
Similarly, lenders obtain an agreement value given by:
ΛL(ϕ) = q¯ϕ
This model features a renegotiation stage that is resolved endogenously in a Nash bargaining
problem. For an η bargaining power for the debtor, the recovery amount ϕ that solves such
problem is given by:
ϕ˜(D,R, z) = arg max
0≤ϕ≤D
{[
ΛG(ϕ;D,R, z)
]η · [ΛL(ϕ)]1−η} (17)
3.8 Recursive Equilibrium
All elements are now available to define a stationary recursive equilibrium in this model
economy. The equilibrium notion is of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium, that is policy ac-
tions about debt, reserves, default, and negotiation, depend only on pre-determined relevant
variables.
Definition 1. A recursive equilibrium is a set of:
i) Value functions: vdef (D,R, z, s) and vaut(R, z)
ii) Debt price function: q(D′, R′, z, s)
iii) Debt recovery function: ϕ˜(D,R, z)
Such that
a) Given the debt price function q(D′, R′, z, s) and the debt recovery function ϕ˜(D,R, z),
the value function vrep(D,R, z, s) solves the government problem (10)
b) Given the value function vrep(D,R, z, s) and the debt recovery function ϕ˜(D,R, z), the
debt price function q(D′, R′, z, s) is consistent with the lenders zero profit condition in
(8)
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c) Given the value functions of repayment vrep(D,R, z, s), autarky vaut(R, z) and the debt
price function q(D′, R′, z, s), the debt recovery function ϕ˜(D,R, z) solves the debt rene-
gotiation problem (17)
4 Calibration and quantitative analysis
To analyze the quantitative properties of the model introduced in the preceding section,
functional forms are chosen and a calibration is proposed for the numerical computation.
The model is used to evaluate the role of international reserves when the debt choice is
endogenous and willingness-to-pay incentives becomes a function of the sovereign’s choices.
4.1 Functional forms
The numerical implementation of the model uses a utility function of the form proposed
by Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988):
u(c, h) =
1
1− σ ·
(
c− Γ h
1+γ
1 + γ
)1−σ
(18)
This utility function has the advantage of shutting down the wealth effect on labor supply,
therefore shocks in the productivity process have an output response of the same signal14.
Regarding the output level in the event of a default, Arellano (2008) showed that a
non-linear function that induces a disproportionally larger loss if the country defaults in an
expansion is important to allow for a large default probability. Also, large output contrac-
tions at defaults, followed by recoveries (coinciding with credit market re-access) have been
documented, for example, in Yeyati and Panizza (2011). Protracted losses in output are
explained with disruptions of credit flows to the private sector that prevents normal produc-
tion (Mendoza and Yue, 2012). As such, a similar functional form is assumed as appropriate
for the productivity under default of the model economy:
z˜(z) =
z if z ≥ zˆzˆ otherwise (19)
The sudden stop shock is added in order to induce the government to hold reserves as
insurance against exogenous shut downs of credit markets. This idea was firstly introduced in
Ranciere and Jeanne (2006) and applied more recently in Bianchi, Hatchondo, and Martinez
14This utility function has a long tradition in literature studying business cycles in small open economies,
for instance, Mendoza (1991), Neumeyer and Perri (2005) or Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
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(2012). In those models, governments hold reserves as a buffer not just against rollover
risks, but also against direct output costs that comes along with a sudden stop. This paper
assumes a milder version of a sudden stop shock that does not impact the economy in any
other way but in the momentarily exclusion from credit markets. Additionally, the sudden
stop shock is modeled as being independent and identically distributed in every period.
Finally, as commonly used in the literature, the productivity process is modeled as a
log-normal AR(1), with
log z′ = ρz log z + ′ , ′ ∼ N(0, σz)
This process is discretized into a 21 state Markov chain using Tauchen (1986) method, with
bounds given by log z ∈
[
−3.5 · σz/
√
1− ρ2z; 3.5 · σz/
√
1− ρ2z
]
.
The model is numerically solved using value function iteration. A detailed explanation
of the algorithm and numerical methods used can be found in the appendix A.3.
4.2 Parameters and calibration
The model is computed at a quarterly frequency. Then, the solution is used to evaluate
the model’s ability to generate large government’s choices of debt and reserves while allowing
the economy to match other features of the data such as default rates and cyclical properties
of consumption, trade balance, or interest rates. For this exercise, Mexico is used as reference
for the parameter choice. As a representative country from the set of emerging economies,
Mexico has an additional advantage of having available data at a quarterly frequency for
a period ranging 1981 to 201215. Moreover, the Mexican economy experienced a sovereign
default episode in 1983 (after a collapse world commodity prices) and a near default in 1994
(when the country was rescued by IMF and the U.S. Treasury). Mexico has been displaying
also strong dynamics in the accumulation of both debt and reserves: in the last decade the
government more than doubled its holdings reserve to about 10% of GDP while keeping a
debt level to GDP ratio of more than 20%.
All the data referring to Mexico are seasonally adjusted quarterly real series obtained
from OECD, except for external debt and international reserves that are taken from the
World Development Indicators at yearly frequency. Output and private consumption are in
logs and the trade balance is presented as a percentage of GDP. Following the methodology
proposed by Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994), an effective tax rate is computed for the
15A quarterly times series on Mexico is publicly available byNeumeyer and Perri (2005) for 1981 to 2001
and, for the remaining period, by OECD .
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Mexican economy16. The interest rate spreads corresponds to the EMBI for 1994–2007 and
all other series are from 1980 to 2010. All series are filtered with a Hodrick–Prescott filter.
Table 4: Parameter values
Parameters Value Target
Risk aversion σ 2 Standard in the literature
Inverse Frish elasticity γ 2 Standard in the literature
Risk free debt price q¯ 1/1.017 US interest rate
Probability of sudden stop ω 0.025 Ranciere and Jeanne (2006)
Output elasticity of labor α 0.5 Labour income share in GDP (Mexico)
Productivity shock persistency ρz 0.95 Output volatility and autocorrelation (Mexico)
Productivity shock volatility σz 0.007 Output volatility and autocorrelation (Mexico)
Discount factor β 0.93 Debt/GDP and volatility of trade balance (Mexico)
Productivity cost zˆ 0.96 Debt/GDP and volatility of trade balance (Mexico)
Bargaining power η 0.2 Benjamin and Wright (2009)
Government spending g 0.116 Average government spending to GDP (Mexico)
Disutility of labor Γ 4.66 Average hours of 1/3
Table 4 lists the parameters used in the baseline solution of the model. The table is
divided in a first set of parameters taken directly from the data or the literature, and a
second set that uses the model simulated moments to infer the parameter values. The two
first parameters refer to utility function of the household. The parameter σ, the risk aversion
coefficient, is set to 2 which is a standard value used in the quantitative macroeconomics
literature. The parameter 1/γ is related with the empirical evidence on the Frish wage
elasticity. Given the range of estimates available in the literature (for example in Greenwood,
Hercowitz, and Huffman 1988), a value of 0.5 is picked for the elasticity, that is γ = 2.
In Ranciere and Jeanne (2006), a sudden stop corresponds to episodes when capital
inflows to GDP, measured by the current account, falls by more than 5 percent of GDP
relative to previous year. They then verify that on average 1 sudden stop occurs every 10
years for a set of developing countries. This estimate gives a 2.5% probability of being hit
by a sudden stop, a value that is also used to set ω.
As common in the literature of sovereign default studies, the risk free bond price q¯ is
set to 1/1.017, intended to capture the historical average quarterly1.7% interest rate of a
five-year US treasury bond. As for the parameter α, governing the output elasticity with
16Appendix A.1 shows how these estimates are computed and specifies data sources.
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respect to output, its value is taken directly from OECD estimates on labor income share
which averages to 0.5.
The remaining parameters are jointly calibrated to match certain moments of the data.
An observed average 20% of public consumption to GDP is targeted setting g = 0.0116.
Due to lack of enough data on haircuts for Mexico’s default episodes, the haircut average of
42% present Benjamin and Wright (2009) dataset is target instead. This is calibrated with
parameter value of η = 0.2. Both parameters governing the productivity shock are calibrated
simultaneously as output dynamics are not directly inherited from the productivity z due
to endogenous labor supply. The targeted data moments are the standard deviation and
autocorrelation of GDP given by stdev(GDP ) = 0.026 and corr(GDPt, GDPt−1) = 0.8 with
correspondent parameter values of σz = 0.007 and ρz = 0.95. The last 2 parameters {β, zˆ}
are simultaneously calibrated to target the following data moments: mean debt to GDP and
the standard deviation of the trade balance. Debt to GDP is targeted to be 32% in the
simulations and the the standard deviation of the trade balance to 1.4%.
4.3 Simulation results
This section compares the quantitative predictions of the model against observed data.
To that end, a model using table 4 parameters is computed and simulated by averaging the
moments of interest for 1000 sample economies, each one running for 500 periods, where
the first 300 are discarded to reduce the influence of initial conditions. These moments are
computed for 44 periods before a default episode and at least 16 periods after a market
exclusion. Table 5 reports the results of the exercise. The standard deviations referred
in the table are expressed in percentage points; y and c refer to the log of output and
consumption of a de-trended series; Drecover/D is the recovery rate faced by lenders at a
default; the default rate is an annual rate; trade balance TB/Y is defined as the difference
between output and consumption relative to output; D/Y and R/Y are, respectively, the
external debt and international reserve level expressed as a percentage of output; G/Y refers
to government spending to GDP; the annual interest spread is given by ispread = (q/q¯)4 − 1.
23
Table 5: Business cycle statistics for the benchmark model and data
Data Model
mean(D/Y ) 32 34
stdev(TB/Y ) 1.4 1.3
stdev(y) 2.6 2.6
mean(Drecover/D) 58 55
mean(G/Y ) 20 20
mean(R/Y ) 9 10
mean(ispread) 3.0 1.4
stdev(ispread) 1.5 1.3
stdev(c)/stdev(y) 1.2 1.4
corr(y, c) 0.94 0.96
corr(y, ispread) -0.56 -0.26
corr(TB/Y, y) -0.66 -0.66
corr(τ, y) -0.49 -0.81
default rate 2.0 2.8
The first impression of the results is that the model can achieve some success at explaining
key features of the data. The model delivers a mean debt to output ratio of 34% while 10%
for reserves to output. Large values of debt to output are sustained in equilibrium due to
intense losses in the event of a default. In the present model, default losses are associated
with exogenous losses of productivity given by the function (19) and an endogenous fiscal
adjustment that distorts production severely by reducing labor supply. This is in contrast
with Arellano (2008) that, to target the default rate observed in Argentina, uses a milder and
completely exogenous output loss, ending up with a model that generates a counterfactually
low level of debt to output. When that is the case, lenders became weary to lend to a country
that suffers mildly if it decides to default. Such is not the case in the current framework.
Figure 6, characterizing numerically the typical default event in the simulations, shows a fall
of output of around 15%, accounted by a 4% slump in productivity and a 11% reduction in
hours. From this contraction of output, only 2% are directly caused by exogenous output
loss given by function (19). As the government advances into default, a debt restructuring
negotiation leads to an agreement with international investors that implies repaying part of
the overdue debt. To finance such repayment, the government has to raise taxes that distort
labor even further, hence generating the described large fall in output.
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Similarly to the result regarding debt, reserves to output also matches the data with an
average level of 10% in the ergodic distribution. In this model reserves play an insurance role:
if the country defaults without any reserves, then consumption has to painfully adjust by
bearing all the losses of default. However, since the probability of default is an endogenous
choice for the country, that risk can be reduced by decreasing the debt it chooses to hold.
Additionally, lower debt maps into lower interest rates. This channel would make reserves less
important as an insurance instrument. Note that this is essentially the result in Alfaro and
Kanczuk (2009): international reserves cannot be sustained in equilibrium17. The positive
reserve holdings observed in the simulation are related with the additional risk that the
country cannot roll-over debt if hit by a sudden stop. In such scenario, the government finds
it optimal to use reserves to repay debt, avoiding the negative impacts of a default. If the
sudden shock carried further costs to the borrower, then reserves would play an even more
prominent role as an insurance mechanism in this model. In fact, such costs are present in
this model as, to repay the outstanding debt, the government has to raise distortionary taxes
with the effects that are in everything similar to the ones described before.
Other features of the data captured by this model refer to the negative correlation between
the trade balance and output, and the default rate. Part of the model’s larger than in the
data default rate is accounted by the presence of the sudden stop shock. As shown in Roch
and Uhlig (2012), adding a sudden stop shock with the characteristics presented in the model,
widens the borrowing risky region as now, for certain shock realizations, the borrower is not
able to roll over his debt. This effect increases the number of defaults in the economy. The
result of a negative correlation between trade balance and output of corr(tb, y) = −0.66
is also obtained in similar papers, for example, Aguiar and Gopinath, 2006 or Yue, 2010.
Net capital outflows occur in recessions due to an increase in interest rates as probability of
default increases in recessions. This effect constrains borrowing endogenously.
Regarding to the mean interest rate spread, the model misses out the data target. The
presence of renegotiation in the model explains why spreads are on average low. This can be
seen from the second term of the right hand side of equation (9) that is non-negative. That
is, the presence of a positive recovery rate in the event of a default becomes priced in new
lending with lower spreads18. Other authors have overcome this issue by assuming a time-
varying lender’s discount factor (Arellano, 2008) or a richer specification of the productivity
loss (Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2012). However, for the current investigation, such anomaly
17Several features in Alfaro and Kanczuk (2009) model explain their striking result: in addition to using
a very simple model, without the features presented in the current paper, the authors assume a quarterly
discount factor of 0.5 and a proportional output loss function.
18Spreads that are lower than what is observed in the data are usually present in models that display
endogenous negotiation, for instance, Yue, 2010 or Erasmo, 2008.
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is not corrected due to computational limitations.
One last relevant moment from table 5 is the negative correlation between output and the
tax rate. To capture the fact that fiscal policy in emerging market economies is often pro-
cyclical, the model features an inelastic government expenditure with endogenous taxation.
Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) show that a similar model can generate realistic pro-
cyclical fiscal policies. As output declines, the government with constrained credit market
access has to raises taxes to compensate the smaller base of taxation. The same idea is
also used in this paper to generate distortions in production that are negatively correlated
with output, thus generating more demand for reserves for insurance purposes. One current
limitation of the current model is that government expenditure doesn’t co-move with output.
The main consequence of that assumption is an overestimation of negative correlation of the
tax rate with output. However, as shown in Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010), making the
government expenditure endogenous would still maintain a negative correlation of taxes and
output - at the cost of adding on the computational burden - without changing qualitatively
any of the mechanisms present in this paper.
4.4 Macroeconomic dynamics around an average default episode
For all default episodes meeting the sampling criteria explained in the previous section,
a time window of 12 periods is collected before and after a default occurs. Using this data
sample, a period-by-period average of each variable of interest is computed and the date of
default normalized to 0. These statistics are used to characterize, in figure 6, the dynamics
of the average default episode that the model outlined produces.
The top two panels show the dynamic of output and productivity around a default. The
pattern of productivity is the standard in models of sovereign default. At t = 0, the level
of productivity z becomes 2.5% below average19. Note that the depicted z doesn’t include
default costs. At period t = 0 and t = 1 the level of productivity once those exogenous costs
captured by function (19) are taken into account becomes 4.5%. This translates into a fall
of output relative to trend of about 5% in t = 0 and 16% in t = 1. The relatively mild drop
of output in period t = 0, despite the exogenous productivity loss, is related with the fact
that, by defaulting, the sovereign is releasing resources to public and private consumption
and so tax pressure is reduced. However in period t = 1, due to the agreement reached in the
debt restructuring, the sovereign has to transfer the agreed overdue debt back to investors,
increasing taxes in the process.
19This magnitude corresponds to a 1.2 standard deviation of the underlying shock as stdev(log z) =
σz√
1−ρ2z
= 2.2%.
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Both consumption and hours suffers in this joint process of debt restructuring and fiscal
adjustment with the first falling 35% and the later 25% at the trough of the crisis. As already
mentioned in the previous section, these large movements in consumption and hours are in
part inflated by the fact that the government expenditure is exogenous in this model20. Both
aggregates quickly recover once the market exclusion is over, that is, from period t = 2, 3, ...
until the next default.
Figure 6: Average default episode generated in the model’s simulations
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Also worth noting is the dynamics of reserves to output. Up until period t = −1,
predicting an eminent default, the government maintains his levels of reserves more or less
20As an alternative Cuadra, Sanchez, and Sapriza (2010) present a model where both private and public
consumption move together, leading to a less aggressive tax reaction to fluctuations of income.
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constant. These reserves are then used in period t = 1 to restructure debt. After period
t = 2, both debt and reserves recover quickly as the cost of holding reserves, given by the
interest spread (bottom left panel), is low for low levels of debt which gets reseted after
regaining market access. However, as debt comes back to normal levels in the following
periods, so does the spreads and demand for reserves falls back to a level close to 10% of
output.
Finally, the right bottom panel in figure 6 shows an average increase of 25pp in the
tax rate during a default episode. While direct tax evidence about labor taxes is difficult to
collect for emerging market economies, using the methodology of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar
(1994), it is possible to construct series on average effective tax rates for OECD countries
that experienced default or near-default crisis in the past: Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Greece.
Inspection of those series confirms that taxes tend to rise around crisis periods, although not
in the same magnitude of what is being generated in the simulation. From equation (6), it
is easy to see that tax rates in this model map into Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007)
definition of a labor wedge. Regarding to financial crisis, Cho and Doblas-Madrid (2013)
finds that labor wedges are major contributors for the observed movements of output. This
implies that in a more loose interpretation of the above model, tax rates can be regarded
as a set of unknown distortions in the labor market induced by the government that are
observed in increasing labor wedges.
4.5 Understanding the mechanism
To better grasp the intuition21 of the results presented in the previous sections, figure 7
depicts the policy functions of the model when the economy is not hit by a sudden stop in
the current period, that is, new debt level D′(D,R, z), reserve holdings R′(D,R, z) and net
debt, simply given by D′(D,R, z)−R′(D,R, z).
The left panel of the figure shows the policy functions for next period reserves and debt
for fixed current reserves level and productivity shock realization, when current debt changes,
that is: R′(D, R¯, z¯) and D′(D, R¯, z¯) for D ∈ [0, Dmax]. Similarly, the central and right panel
shows the same functions when current reserves or current productivity are allowed to vary.
The first observation is that reserves and debt are correlated and tend to move together. In
particular the right panel shows that gross capital flows, defined as D′ +R′ are pro-cyclical
and tend to collapse in recessions, consistent with empirical findings of Broner, Didier, Erce,
and Schmukler (2013). Additionally, the two panels at the left shows that lows levels of net
debt, represented by the triangles, are associated with large levels of both debt and reserves.
21A simple two-period model developed in the appendix A.2 can be useful to understand the intuition
behind the full model.
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This is because debt implies a low probability of default and therefore low spreads. But with
low spreads, the cost of holding reserves is also low, and the sovereign has an incentive to
accumulate large levels of both debt and reserves. This is also the reason why in figure 6
reserves and debt tend to recuperate quickly after a default.
Figure 7: Policy functions for new debt, reserves and net debt
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Figure 8: Recovery rate schedules for overdue debt
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Figure 8 plots the equilibrium debt recovery rate schedule as a function of debt and
reserves. Similar to the findings in Yue (2010), debt recovery rate is decreasing with debt
level with a threshold of debt before which recovery rate is 100%. A close inspection of
problem (17) should clarify why the recovery rate schedule has that shape: in the bargaining
problem, the settlement argument from ϕ is independent of the amount defaulted D, so
the recovery rate schedule as a function of D becomes 0 ≤ Rec(D) = max {1, ϕ/D} ≤ 1.
29
Intuitively, after defaulting, D becomes ’sunk’ and agents only bargain about future values
that don’t depend on D. That is not the case with R since a marginal unit of reserves
impacts differently the value of renegotiation and the outside value for the sovereign which
amounts to permanent exclusion. This means that different level of reserves implies different
bargaining positions and, therefore, different debt reschedule outcomes. Note that in financial
autarky, the sovereign doesn’t have any additional purpose than to smooth consumption in
subsequent periods. However, if the decision on restructuring prevails, anticipating that
transfers will be made to lenders, the sovereign will have an additional incentive to save on
top of the previous consumption smoothing motif. But this must mean that a marginal unit
of reserves must be more valuable under restructuring than under permanent autarky, that
is equivalent to say that the total surplus of the Nash bargaining problem is increasing in
R. This argument justifies why the function of the right panel of the figure is increasing.
Intuitively, reserves have more value for a government seeking credit market access than for
a government staying in permanent autarky.
Table 6: Effects of international reserves on haircut (dependent variable: haircut in % of
overdue debt)
Haircut OLS Data OLS Model
L.reserves to gdp (%) -1.6∗∗ -1.4∗∗
L.debt to gdp (%) 0.31∗∗ 0.98∗∗
L.rgdp growth rate (%) 0.46 0.14
Constant 32.84 24.52
Observations 51 51
R2 0.23 0.49
The shapes depicted in figure 8 are consistent with the evidence presented in section 2,
figure 4. To better assess how consistent are the debt recovery rate schedules with the data,
the same statistics presented in table 3 are constructed using using data simulated from
the model. The results are presented in table 6 where, for convenience, part of table 3 is
replicated. Overall the model performs well at capturing the correlations found in the data,
that is, each additional percentage point of lagged reserves to GDP is associated with an
average fall in the haircut of 1.4pp in the model, while the data generates 1.6pp fall.
Figure 9 shows the debt price schedules for a country with high and low endowment (left
panel) and high and low reserves (right and left panel). The plot in the left shows that
prices are decreasing with debt levels as previously noted in the literature. More debt is
associated with a higher default probability and lower recovery rate, which translates into
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higher spreads. Note that the debt price also increases with productivity, thus explaining why
the correlation spread/output in table 5 is negative. When a government receives a bad shock
realization in productivity, an increase in the net debt increases the country’s ex ante default
incentive. A higher default probability and a lower debt recovery rate generate a higher
sovereign debt spread, and thus a negative correlation exists between spreads and output.
Additionally both panels shows also that more reserves are associated with larger debt prices.
Keeping the debt level constant, larger reserves implies lower net debt, thus decreasing
default probability and, as explained above, a higher debt recovery rate. Both effects implies
that reserves are positively correlated with spreads, also consistent with regression evidence
presented in table 2 from section 2.
Figure 9: Price schedule for new debt as a function of current debt and productivity
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4.6 Sensitive Analysis
The model presented in section 3 adds many non-standard features to the more traditional
models of sovereign default. To try to understand how these features change the results
regarding the simultaneous holdings of debt and reserves, the baseline model is recomputed
shutting down or changing some features to highlight the mechanisms that are driving the
results. In this exercise, the following features are changed:
• Assume that government expenditure are zero: G = 0;
• Assume that there’s lump sum tax policies instead of distortionary: equation (2) be-
comes
ct = wtht + pit + Tt
where Tt are lump-sum taxes;
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• Assume a constant relative risk aversion utility function (CRRA): equation (18) be-
comes
u(c, h) =
c1−σ
1− σ − Γ ·
h1+γ
1 + γ
;
• Assume there’s no sudden stops in the economy: ω = 0;
• Assume borrowers have all bargaining power: γ = 1 thus ϕ˜(D,R, z) = 0 ∀D,R, z,
that is, renegotiation is shutdown.
To maintain some comparability between the baseline and the alternative models, only the
volatility of output is targeted by re-calibrating the standard deviation of the innovation
of the productivity process σz. The computed alternative model is simulated to generate
all moments of table 5. However, because the main interest is on the impact of debt and
reserve holdings, only the simulated distributions of the two variables are presented here22
by showing the kernel density estimates of debt and reserves for a bandwidth choice varying
between 0.01 and 0.03. Figure 10 shows the results where the panels at the left represent the
distribution of external debt, while the ones at the right of external reserves; and the solid
lines are for the baseline distributions, while the dashed lines for the alternative distributions.
The first 4 panels of the picture show very similar results: reducing the level of fiscal
distortions in the model implies an higher level of debt to GDP, but reserves become less
important for the sovereign. Reserves play an important role in the baseline economy as fiscal
adjustments are costly and affect production. Eliminating such distortions reduces the need
for reserves to 3-5%. The next 2 panels study the impact of using a CRRA utility function
instead of the GHH function adopted in the baseline model. Qualitatively, this alternative
doesn’t change much, however, using a CRRA utility function decreases reserves to about
5% of output. This can be explained by the presence of wealth effects that dampens the
fluctuations in output generated by productivity shocks. That is, with this utility function
labor is not necessarily co-moving with output and this extra degree of adjustment reduces
demand for reserves.
The panels relative to sudden stops show that the presence of such shock is not essential
to generate realistic demand for reserves. As long as the probability of default remains
positive, the important movements of fiscal consolidation and debt restructuring requires
some kind of insurance that can be provided by reserves. Finally the last 2 panel show
the most striking results from this exercise: shutting down renegotiation reduces abruptly
the levels of debt and reserve holding. Under this specification, the model resembles Alfaro
and Kanczuk (2009) in the sense that reserves plays no role in the optimal decision of the
22Complete results for the simulated moments can be found in the appendix A.4.
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sovereign.
Figure 10: Distribution approximations of debt and reserves for different model specifications
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This result confirms the findings in the previous sections that showed that a substantial
part of the cost associated with a default, resides on debt restructuring. Table 7 summarizes
the findings from the exercise.
Table 7: Simulation results to alternative specification of the model
mean Baseline G = 0 No Distortions CRRA No Sudden Stop No Renegotiation
D/Y 34% 51% 49% 32% 33% 5.4%
R/Y 10% 3% 5% 5% 7% 0.3%
To conclude this section, it is worth mention that part of the simulation results may be
unrelated with the model solution, but to deficiencies in the numerical computation of the
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model. A visual inspection of figure7 shows that the policy functions display certain “lumpy”
areas that present due to issues in the numerical precision of the computation. Hatchondo,
Martinez, and Sapriza (2010) studied the quantitative properties of models of sovereign
default and conclude that precision is quite relevant for models that feature high sensitivity
of the bond price to different bond levels. They advise researchers to either use a very fine
grid point for the endowment process or to make the problem continuous by interpolating
the value functions. Neither of those two approaches were used in this paper as the current
model is already harder to compute than most common models: reserves, being an extra
state variable, expands dramatically the problem’s state space; each allocation requires the
solution of a non-linear equation for the labor market; high order interpolation is not easily
implementable as the problem has some defined regions of the state space whose value is
negative infinite, thus, attempts to interpolate such functions leads to the so called Runge’s
phenomena. Future work will attempt to fix these computational issues.
5 Conclusion
This paper studied the extent to which reserves can have an important role as insurance
instruments in a simple model that delivers realistic prediction regarding other dimensions
of the data. Holding positive amounts of reserves is costly as current consumption is reduced
when interest rate spreads are positive. However, reserves can be beneficial if the economy
experiences a financial crisis that forces consumption to adjust abruptly.
A model of equilibrium default augmented with reserve accumulation and sudden stop
shocks is computed and simulated in order to evaluate if the benefits of holding reserves
can compensate the costs. The model is calibrated to generate simulated moments that are
similar to the ones observed for the Mexican economy. A positive and non-trivial average
reserve to output can be generated while keeping quantitative realistic moments in dimen-
sions such as debt to output, pro-cyclical trade balance, and co-movements of consumption
and output. Reserves play an insurance role by allowing consumption to be smoothed if
the economy defaults or is hit by a sudden stop shock. Default carries substantial adjust-
ments when the government raises taxes in order to accommodate inelastic spendings and
transfers of restructured debt back to lenders. These large penalties of default turn out to
be fundamental in generating realistic demand for reserves: without distortionary taxation
the demand for reserves drops from 10% of GDP to 5%, and without renegotiation they fall
further to close to zero. Moreover, endogenous renegotiation generates a debt recovery rate
that is increasing with reserves and, in turn, affects the government’s ex-ante incentive to
default. In equilibrium, debt is priced to taking into account the risk of default and restruc-
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turing. As such, the model predicts that interest rates and haircuts decrease with reserves,
as observed in the data.
It should be noted that the results obtained abstain from many factors that, most likely,
also influence the demand for reserves. Notably, this paper abstracts from the typical ex-
change rate management explanations (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor, 2010). However,
recent developments in the literature have started to interact exchange-rate policy with
optimal default (Na, Schmitt-Grohe, Uribe, and Yue, 2014), thus providing an analytical
framework to integrate international reserves in the analysis. This is a matter to be studied
in future research.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Sources
The evidence present in section 2 uses the following variable:
Debt to GDP: from the World Development Indicators as the sum of long-term external
debt stocks, public and publicly guaranteed in current US$ (DT.DOD.DPPG.CD) with
short-term external debt stocks in current US$ (DT.DOD.DSTC.CD) divided by GDP
in current US$ (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD) at annual frequency.
Reserves to GDP: from the World Development Indicators as total reserves (includes
gold) incurrent US$ (FI.RES.TOTL.CD) divided by GDP in current US$ (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD)
at annual frequency.
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Spreads: computed as an arithmetic, market-capitalization-weighted average of bond spreads
over US treasury bonds of comparable duration from data collected in J.P.Morgan’s
Emerging Markets Bond Index Plus (EMBI+) at monthly frequency.
RGDP growth rate: from the World Development Indicators as the annual percentage
growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG).
Revenues to GDP: from the IMF World Economic Outlook as the general government
revenue as a percent of GDP (GGR_NGDP) at annual frequency.
Expenditures to GDP: from the IMF World Economic Outlook as the general govern-
ment total expenditure as a percent of GDP (GGX_NGDP) at annual frequency.
Inflation: from the IMF World Economic Outlook as the annual percentages of average
consumer prices on year-on-year changes (PCPIPCH).
Current account to GDP: from the IMF World Economic Outlook as the annual current
account balance as a percent of GDP (BCA_NGDPD).
Openness: from the World Development Indicators as the sum of exports of goods and
services as % of GDP (NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS) with imports of goods and services as % of
GDP (NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS) at annual frequency.
Contagion: constructed as the average of the EMBI+ spreads across all countries, excluding
the country of the observation, in a specific region (Latin America, Africa, Europe,
Asia).
Rule of law: index from constructed by theWorld Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators
measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Urban population: from the World Development Indicators as the urban population a
percentage of total population (SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS).
Haircut: estimates taken from Benjamin and Wright (2009) on per dollar creditor losses on
historical sovereign default episodes.
Section 4 uses data from Mexico to construct business cycle statistics. Data is taken, at
quarterly frequency, from Neumeyer and Perri (2005) for 1981 to 2001 and from OECD for
2002 to 2012. Debt and reserves uses instead data from theWorld Development Indicators at
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an annual frequency. Moments are computed using de-trended series using an HP-filter with
a 1600 parameter. Consumption and income are expressed in logs. The default frequency is
taken from historical Mexican defaults identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) in the last 2
centuries. Data for tax rates uses OECD Revenue Statistics - Comparative tables following
Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994) methodology to compute effective average tax rates on
labor. In particular, the following variables are used:
GOS: Gross operating surplus and gross mixed income from OECD National Accounts
W: Compensation of employees from OECD National Accounts
1100: Income, profit and capital gains taxes of individuals from OECD Revenue Statistics
2000: Social security contributions from OECD Revenue Statistics
2200: Social security contributions of employers from OECD Revenue Statistics
3000: Payroll taxes from OECD Revenue Statistics
Using these variables, the two effective average tax rates are given by:
τh =
1100
GOS +W
τ l =
τh ·W + 2000 + 3000
W + 2200
Where τh is the personal income tax and τ lis the labor income tax, used to compute the
correlation with output.
A.2 Two Period Model of Debt and Reserves
To better understand the intuition of the results presented in the main text a simple
two-period model is introduced. Due to its designed simplicity, this model isn’t adequate to
derive quantitative conclusions about the dynamics of the sovereign incentives to repay debt.
However, different aspects of the role of reserves in a model allowing for debt default can be
studied sequentially by assuming environments with different degrees of market completeness
or commitment to repay debt.
The model environment involves an agent that lives for two periods and that is endowed
with a certain income y1 in the first period and an uncertain income y2 in the second period
that can only take two outcomes yh > yl. Assume that p is the probability of receiving yh.
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Lifetime utility from consuming c1 and c2 is given by:
W = c1 + βEu(c2) = c1 + βp · u(ch2) + β(1− p) · u(cl2) (20)
where u(c) is an utility function with u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0, and β is the discount coefficient.
Note that the agent is risk neutral in the first period while risk averse in the second. This
choice intends to capture, with a very simple specification, two distinct forces of sovereign
default models: agents wish to bring consumption from the future into the present - captured
by the coefficient β; agents wish to to smooth consumption emerging from uncertainty -
captured by the uncertain endowment and the second period utility function.
Complete Markets
For the complete markets case, it is assumed that the agent can issue debt contracts with
a risk-neutral external investor. Moreover, the agent can commit to repay his debts to the
external investor. Under this assumptions, the agent budget constraint becomes:
c1 = y1 + q
hDh + qlDl (21)
ci2 = y
i −Di, i = h, l (22)
where qh and ql are prices for debt contracts if, respectively, the high or low income state of
the world realize in period 2.
The typical solution for the maximization of (20), subject to (21) and (22) by choosing
{Dh, Dl} is given by:
qh = βpu′(ch2)
ql = β(1− p)u′(cl2)
And, if the borrower is small compared to the external investor, then:
q¯ = βu′(c2) (23)
where q¯ = qh + ql is the risk free debt price (or equivalently the external investor discount
rate). Equations (23), (21) and (22) characterize the optimal allocation {c∗1, c∗2} as function
of β, q¯, yh, yl, p. Note that under complete markets consumption in the second period is
certain even when income isn’t. This occurs because debt contracts are contingent.
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Incomplete Markets with Full Commitment
Suppose now that the agent only has access to non contingent debt contracts. His be-
comes:
c1 = y1 + q¯D (24)
ci2 = y
i −D, i = h, l (25)
Note that now debtD has to be re-payed whether the agent receives a high or low endowment.
First order condition now implies
q¯ = βEu′(ci2) = β
[
pu′(ch2) + (1− p)u′(cl2)
]
(26)
The solution of equations (24), (25) and (26), gives now an optimal allocation {c∗1, ch∗2 , cl∗2 }
where ch∗2 > cl∗2 . That is, under incomplete markets the agent is not able to smooth con-
sumption in the second period.
Incomplete Markets without Full Commitment
With an option to repudiate debt, an agent with debt D decides to default in period 2 if
the associated consumption is larger than what he would under repayment. Assuming that
the losses of default imply an income given by:
y˜(y) =
yd,h if y = yhyd,l otherwise
Then, for some level of debt D:
cdef > crep ⇒ch,rep = yh −D > yd,h = ch,rep (27)
cl,rep = yl −D < yd,l = cl,rep (28)
This default choice implies that the price one unit of un-contingent debt is q = q¯p, so that
the consumer budget constraint becomes:
c1 = y1 + qD (29)
ch2 = y
h −D (30)
cl2 = y
d,l (31)
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The first order condition and some algebra implies that q¯ = βu′(ch2), that together with (29),
(30) and (31) implies an allocation of consumption {c∗1, ch∗2 , cl∗2 } where ch∗2 > cl∗2 . Similarly
to the previous case, is not necessary that consumption can be completely smoothed in the
second period, irrespectively of the contingency that default allows.
Incomplete Markets with Reserves and without Full Commitment
Now the agent sees his contract choice expanded by reserves. The budget constraint is
now given by:
c1 = y1 + qD − q¯R
ch2 = y
h +R−D
cl2 = y
d,l +R
And the first order conditions by:
D : q = βpu′(ch2)⇔ q¯ = βu′(ch2) (32)
R : q¯ = β
[
pu′(ch2) + (1− p)u′(cl2)
]⇒ u′(ch2) = u′(cl2) (33)
Implying an optimal allocation {c∗1, c∗2}. This result can be summarized in the following
claim.
Claim 1. (consumption smoothing) Under incomplete markets with reserves and without
full commitment, ch2 = cl2 = c2 is a solution for a given y˜(y) and β.
Proof. For a given D choose y˜(y) such that (27) and (28) hold. Given (32), such D can
be supported for a specific β. The rest of the proof follows directly from the first order
conditions.
This result shows that reserves and the ability to default allows the agent to perfectly
smooth consumption in the second period. In this sense, reserves are useful to complete the
market.
Claim 2. (demand for reserves and loss of default) Under incomplete markets with reserves
and without full commitment ∂R/∂yl,d < 0 for a given y˜(y) and β
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Proof. This result follows from applying the implicit function theorem to (33) and claim 1:
q¯ = β
[
pu′(ch2) + (1− p)u′(cl2)
]
⇔ q¯ = β [q¯/β + (1− p)u′(yd,l +R)]
⇒ ∂R
∂yd,l
= −1 < 0
The result from claim 2 says that the demand for reserves is increasing with the output
loss. This gives the intuition why the full model adds counter-cyclical distortionary taxation:
increasing taxes when the economy is in default further depresses the economy thus increasing
the usefulness of reserves in such events.
Reserves and Renegotiation
Consider that if the defaults in the second period, lenders make a one-shot offer of debt
restructuring by granting market access to the agent. That option grants the following utility
to the lender:
W d = u(c2) + A
where A is meant to capture in this simple framework all future benefits of regaining access
to international credit markets. The offer made an offer of a debt restructuring D˜ such that
the agent is indifferent in accepting and rejecting the offer, that is:
u(y +R) = u(y +R− D˜) + A
That equation implicitly defines a recovery schedule D˜(y,R,A) ≤ D whereD is the defaulted
debt. The following result follows:
Claim 3. (recovery rate is increasing with reserves) ∂
(
D˜/D
)
/∂R ≥ 0
Proof. This follows immediately from the fact that u′ < 0 and y +R ≥ y +R− D˜.
This result indicates that an agent is willing to transfer larger amounts of reserves to
lenders if there are gains of regaining market access.
A.3 Numerical computation
The computational algorithm is coded in Fortran and is similar to the one used in Arellano
(2008) or Yue (2010). For error tolerance v and ϕ, the algorithm steps follow the below
sequence:
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1. Discretize space of D, R and the shock process z
2. Solve first for the value of permanent autarky vaut(R, z) using value function iteration:
(a) guess vaut,0(R, z)
(b) using vaut,0(R, z) solve for the maximization (14) to get vaut,1(R, z), using a non-
linear equation solver to determine the labor equilibrium in (15) and (16) and a
grid search method over the space of R
(c) evaluate ||vaut,1(R, z)− vaut,0(R, z)|; if it’s larger than v iterate on (a) using
vaut,0(R, z) := vaut,1(R, z) until converge
3. Guess the the recovery function ϕ0(D,R, z), and the value function vrep,0(D,R, z, s)
4. Use ϕ0(D,R, z) to update the value function to vrep,1(D,R, z, s) using a grid search
method over the space of (D,R):
(a) labor equilibrium in (11) and (12) is obtained using a non-linear equation solver
(b) vdef (D,R, z) by maximizing (13) using ϕ0(D,R, z) and vrep,0(D,R, z, s)
(c) debt price function is computed from the definition (9) using the functions ϕ0(D,R, z),
vrep,0(D,R, z, s) and vdef (D,R, z)
5. Evaluate ||vrep,1(D,R, z, s)− vrep,0(D,R, z, s)|; if it’s larger than v iterate on (4) using
vrep,0(D,R, z, s) := vrep,1(D,R, z, s) until converge
6. Using vrep,1(D,R, z, s), compute ϕ1(D,R, z) by solving (17) using a grid search method
over the space of D
7. Evaluate |ϕ1(D,R, z)− ϕ0(D,R, z)|; if it’s larger than v iterate on (3) using ϕ0(D,R, z) :=
ϕ1(D,R, z) until converge.
In the benchmark model, the state space of D and R is [0; 0.64] with 90 equally spaced grid-
points, that is, both debt and reserves share the same state space. The productivity process
log z is discretized with 21 grid points using the method proposed in Tauchen (1986) with
bounds given by a margin of 3.5 unconditional standard deviations with respect to the mean.
The maximum error allowed is ν = 10−6. The non-linear equation solver to determine labor
equilibrium uses Brent’s method.
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A.4 Simulation results for alternative specifications of the model
This section shows the simulation results from using alternative specifications of the
model using the parameter values from table 4.
Data Baseline G = 0 No Dist CRRA No SS No Ren
mean(D/Y ) 32 34 51 49 32 33 5
stdev(TB/Y ) 1.4 1.3 2.6 2.8 1.8 1.3 0.9
stdev(y) 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6
mean(Drecover/D) 58 55 50 56 56 53 0
mean(G/Y ) 20 20 0 20 20 20 20
mean(R/Y ) 9 10 3 5 5 7 0
mean(ispread) 3.0 1.4 2.4 2.5 2.7 0.4 7.7
stdev(ispread) 1.5 1.3 2.4 2.9 2.9 1 16.8
stdev(c)/stdev(y) 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.2
corr(y, c) 0.94 0.96 0.92 0.83 0.91 0.97 0.97
corr(y, ispread) -0.56 -0.26 -0.45 -0.36 -0.42 -0.37 -0.49
corr(TB/Y, y) -0.66 -0.66 -0.69 -0.4 -0.46 -0.69 -0.56
corr(τ, y) -0.49 -0.81 -0.69 - 0.76 -0.82 -0.78
default rate 2.0 2.8 4.1 4.8 5.2 0.8 8.2
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